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•  The difficulty of prioritizing projects in critical infrastructures 
•  Prioritizing/selection of projects for investment 
–  Protecting critical infrastructures and prioritizing 
–  When to prioritize 
•  Traditional methods of prioritizing projects 
•  Economic evaluation methods, e.g., cost-benefit /net present value 
methods 
•  Multi-criteria approaches 
–  Problems with traditional methods 
•  Network theory approach applied to critical infrastructures 
–  Ted Lewis’s approach 
•  Strengths and weaknesses 
–  Interdiction approach 
•  Strengths and weaknesses 




•  Prioritizing  
–  Important function in capital facilities 
planning and financing 
–  Traditional Methods 
•  Economic Evaluation Methods 
–  Cost-benefit/net present value analyses 
•  Multi-criteria approaches 
4 
Critical Infrastructures: Vast and 
complex systems 
•  Critical infrastructures 
–  Defined in Critical Foundations(1997 Pres. Com. 
 Report): 
•  Essential services that underpin our society’s “national defense, 
economic prosperity and quality of life” 
•  Transportation, oil and gas production and storage, water supply, 
emergency services, government services, banking and finance and 
telecommunications 
–  2003 National Strategy for Homeland Security: 
•  “Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters” 
•  Added: Agriculture and Food, Public Health, Defense Industrial Base, 
Chemical and Hazardous Materials, and Postal and Shipping plus 5 key 
assets: National Monuments & Icons, Nuclear Power Plants, Dams, 
Government Facilities, Commercial Key Assets (Major skyscrapers) 
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The difficulty of prioritizing 
projects in critical infrastructures 
 
•  Critical Infrastructures 
are so vast, we cannot 
hope to protect every 
part of the system. 
•  We cannot be 
comprehensive 
•  We often lack technical 
knowledge of these 
critical infrastructures to 
understand how to 
protect them 
Network Architecture of the Major 
Refined Oil Transmission and 
Distribution Pipelines in the 
Energy Sector 
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CIs are interdependent 
Source: National Research Council. 2002. Making the Nation Safer.  The National Academies 
Press. 
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Protecting Critical Infrastructures 
•  A mandate to reduce the vulnerability of CIs 
or to increase their resilience 
•  Prioritizing assets in CIs to reduce their 
vulnerability to breakdown from natural or 
intentional causes requires a risk-based 
analysis:  
–  Identifying their contribution to a system’s 
performance 
–  Major hazards they are exposed to 
–  Susceptibility to specific hazards 
–  The system’s adaptive capacity 
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When to prioritize 
•  Prioritizing can be applied at several stages of the 
planning process 
–  Before risk assessment vs. after risk assessment 
–  NIPP: calls for prioritizing after risk assessment to set 
priorities for implementation   
•  Does not explicitly recognize the need to prioritize before 
•  Prioritizing before crucial because of vast nature of CIs 
•  Faced with this issue, sector-specific plans have added 
screening or filtering processes to evaluate an asset’s criticality 
•  My focus:  
–  initial screening of vast inventories of CIs to facilitate 
analysis of their vulnerability:  
•  criticality analysis 
9 
Traditional methods of prioritizing 
applied to critical infrastructures 
•  Economic Evaluation Methods 
–  Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are 
used in the selection of assets 
–  Useful once an element of a system identified as 
vulnerable 
•  Employed to evaluate the economic viability of 
alternative projects for hardening or making more 
resilient a specific asset in a system 
–  Not useful to identify assets  
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Traditional methods of prioritizing: 
Multi-criteria approaches 
•  Departmental or 
functional priorities 
•  Broad Categories of 
Need 
•  Urgency-of-need criteria 
•  Weighted rating of 
urgency-of-need and 
related criteria 
•  Program priorities, 
goals, and service 
needs assessment and 
planning 
•  Most based on scaling 
–  Simple or weighted 
•  System gets reduced to 
criteria 
•  Projects assigned a 
rating 
•  Priorities set based on 
rating 
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Example of multi-criteria approach to 
prioritize assets: SAIC’s AASHTO 
Guidebook 
SAIC Report to AASHTO, A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment (2002), pp. 9-10 
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Step 2. Establish and Assign Values to Each 
Asset  
SAIC Report to AASHTO, A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment (2002), p. 
12 
13 SAIC Report to AASHTO, A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment 
(2002), p. 14 
Example 
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Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Multi-criteria Approaches 
•  Strengths: 
–  Allow stakeholder involvement in selection of criteria, scoring 
and weighting 
–  Do not require extensive calculation, simulation or modeling 
•  Can be applied by many individuals without much training 
•  Weaknesses 
–  In analytic process, they lose information of the system as a 
system 
•  Interconnectedness is lost 
•  Spatial character of CIs 
–  They do not address the network aspect of these systems 
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Network theory approach applied to 
critical infrastructures: Lewis’s MBVA 
Source: Ted Lewis. 2006. Critical Infrastructures Protection in Homeland 
Security. P. 110. Wiley and Sons.  
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Barabasi: normal (random distribution of 
linkages) vs. power law distributions (scale-free) 
Scale-free refers to non-random networks where the distribution of linkages 
follows a power distribution rather than a normal distribution. 
A.-L. Barabasi. 2003. Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What it Means for 
Business, Science, and Everyday Life. PLUME Cambridge, MA 
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Types of network 
Source: Ted Lewis. 2006. Critical Infrastructures Protection in Homeland Security. P.
83. Wiley and Sons 
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Characteristics of  CIs 
•  Concentration of assets, critical nodes or 
hubs 
•  Networks are non-random, scale-free or small 
world 
•  Simple critical node testing 
–  Prepare a histogram 
–  Does the distribution follow a power law?  If so, 
scale free. 
–  If the graph analysis reveals clusters, then small 
worlds 
•  Approach has an effective strategy to address 
cascade failures—protect the hubs 
•  Simulations 
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Example of graphing an 
infrastructure network 
Source: Ted Lewis. 2006. Critical Infrastructures Protection in 
Homeland Security. P. 80. Wiley and Sons 
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Testing Network Analysis as a 
Prioritizing Method: The Interstate 
Highway System 
Source: Ted Lewis. 2006. Critical Infrastructures Protection in 
Homeland Security. P. 90-91. Wiley and Sons 
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Strengths and weaknesses of Lewis’s 
network theory approach 
•  Strengths 
–  Simple test of node degree to identify critical hubs 
•  Requires minimal spatial information about a system, and moderate 
training to apply the test 
•  Graphic display, and computer simulations are convincing 
•  Most useful for scale-free networks, less so for small world networks 
•  Challenges 
–  Fewer linkages may mean more rather than less vulnerability 
•  Lack of redundancy may be more important than degree of 
connectedness 
–  Where the sequence or order or direction of flow in a supply chain 
is important, i.e., when a node is a source, as in oil pipeline 
transmission systems, other network indicators may be necessary 
to identify network asset priority 
–  Where node is geographically too large, e.g., Chicago, and the 
network connections too redundant. In general, network analysis at 
a regional or smaller scale may require subcomponent analysis, 




•  Used by military strategists to minimize the disruption 
or interdiction of critical nodes or links in a supply 
network or chain 
•  In this network theory approach, often network 
facilities prioritized based on simple, graph theoretic 
measures following a similar two-step process: 
–  First, identify criticality, then vulnerability. 
•  Two types of indicators are used: 
–  Global theoretic measures, e.g., indices of complexity 
–  Local network measures, such as the degree of 
connectedness index that Lewis uses 
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Strengths and weaknesses of 
network interdiction approaches 
•  Strengths 
–  Employ larger set of indicators to test for priority, 
and can obtain better measures of system 
priorities 
•  Challenges 
–  Greater data requirements on flow and 
performance 
–  More opaque to stakeholders, requires greater 
mathematical training than other approaches 
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Prioritizing in CIs requires 
systems analysis 
•  Multi-criteria methods fail to address the systems 
aspects of CIs 
•  Network analysis is too abstract 
–  Reduces systems to nodes and links 
•  Both multi-criteria methods and network methods are 
concerned with system performance   
•  But only systems analysis aims at outlining how vital 
components achieve system performance 
•  In systems analysis, two major tools to model 
performance of a complex system: 
–  Causal loop diagrams 
–  Stock and flow diagrams 
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Causal Loop and stock and 
flow diagrams 
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Prioritizing in CIs 
•  Enhanced stock and flow  
diagrams 
–  Incorporating:  
•  the condition of components, their availability, 
cost, rapidity of replacement if disabled, 
security measures at the asset level, and 
protocols and regulations controlling the system 
and component functioning 
–  Through GIS or hypertext 
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In Conclusion 
•  Reviewed traditional and network-theory 
approaches for prioritizing assets in critical 
infrastructure systems 
–  Including strengths and weaknesses 
•  The role of assets in the performance of 
systems is vital for prioritizing assets in CIs 
•  Analysis of CIs as systems is necessary to 
establish role of assets in performance of 
assets 
–  Proposed GIS enhanced stock and flow diagrams 
to graphically display performance of CIs 
